![]() ![]() Khrushcheva of The New School argues that, just as the Soviet Union was the big loser of the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972, Russia will likely turn out to be the big loser from the new alliance between President Vladimir Putin and Xi. Likewise, former Spanish foreign minister Ana Palacio warns that it could upend the rules-based international order, which democracies, led by the US and Europe, must work together to defend. Roachworries that a vulnerable United States is not prepared for a deepening Sino-Russian rapprochement. But Minxin Pei of Claremont McKenna College refutes the revisionist US view that engagement with China was therefore a strategic blunder, arguing that the policy served the interests of both countries until Chinese President Xi Jinping pursued a more assertive and expansionist course.įor that reason, Brahma Chellaney of the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi argues that preserving America’s global preeminence will require US leaders to focus on the central threat posed by China, and not be distracted by Russia’s current aggression toward Ukraine.īut the two authoritarian powers are presenting an increasingly united front. In this Big Picture, Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, thinks the most important legacy of Nixon’s meeting with Mao Zedong was that it enabled China’s subsequent economic opening to the world. ![]() ![]() But with Sino-American relations currently in crisis, a new marriage of convenience between China and Russia is threatening to turn the tables on America. As historian Walter LaFeber said, “Instead of using Vietnam to contain China, Nixon concluded that he had better use China to contain Vietnam.” For its part, the PRC was desirous of another ally in its increasingly tense relationship with the Soviet Union and certainly welcomed the possibility of increased U.S.-China trade.US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China 50 years ago shifted the Cold War balance of power and undermined the Soviet Union’s global influence. Despite their claims of socialist solidarity, the PRC and North Vietnam were, at best, strongly suspicious allies. In addition, the United States might be able to make use of the Chinese as a counterweight to North Vietnam. The United States could use closer diplomatic relations with China as leverage in dealing with the Soviets, particularly on the issue of Vietnam. Nixon’s trip to China, therefore, was a move calculated to drive an even deeper wedge between the two most significant communist powers. In fact, Nixon was scheduled to travel to meet Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev shortly after completing his visit to China. policy requests (such as pressuring the North Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty acceptable to the United States). Nixon, and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger saw a unique opportunity in these circumstances-diplomatic overtures to the PRC might make the Soviet Union more malleable to U.S. The American fear of a monolithic communist bloc had been modified, as a war of words-and occasional border conflicts-erupted between the Soviet Union and the PRC in the 1960s. The American people were impatient for an end to the conflict, and it was becoming increasingly apparent that the United States might not be able to save its ally, South Vietnam, from its communist aggressors. And the war in Vietnam was not going well. In Vietnam, the Soviets, not the Chinese, had become the most significant supporters of the North Vietnamese regime. The situation had changed dramatically since that time, though. Truman for “losing” China to the communists in 1949. During the 1940s and 1950s, he had been a vocal cold warrior and had condemned the Democratic administration of Harry S. ![]() Nixon seemed an unlikely candidate to thaw those chilly relations. troops fought in Korea during the early-1950s, and Chinese aid and advisors supported North Vietnam in its war against the United States. In fact, the two nations had been bitter enemies. The United States had never stopped formally recognizing the PRC after Mao Zedong’s successful communist revolution of 1949. Still mired in the unpopular and frustrating Vietnam War in 1971, Nixon surprised the American people by announcing a planned trip to the PRC in 1972. READ MORE: How Nixon's 1972 Visit to China Changed the Balance of Cold War Power Nixon’s historic visit began the slow process of the re-establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and communist China. In an amazing turn of events, President Richard Nixon takes a dramatic first step toward normalizing relations with the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) by traveling to Beijing for a week of talks. ![]()
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